We study the trading of dealers around new bond issues underwritten by affiliates using a complete matched record of U.S. bond market transactions, ownership structure, and bond issues from 2005 to 2015. Compared to dealers unaffiliated to the lead underwriter, affiliated dealers pay 30-60 basis points more for the issuer's preexisting bonds-prior to, during, and after the issuance event. We interpret this phenomenon as price maneuvers aimed at lowering the reference yield for new issue investors. By examining dealer inventories and profits, we find no support for alternative explanations such as hedging, informed trading, or competitive advantage in market-making.
Financial institutions typically play multiple roles in capital markets. One notable example is that a dealer bank underwrites and intermediates securities at the same time. Previous literature has shown that being affiliated with the underwriter of a security affects the trading behavior of a dealer of that security (Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara, 2000) . Affiliation may carry contractual obligations to the issuer, such as liquidity provision or price stabilization, and it may establish the dealer's role as dominant market-maker of that security because of economies of scale.
However, the role of underwriter-dealers in mediating a link between the primary market and the secondary market for other securities of the issuing firm is understudied. In this paper, we begin to fill this gap by investigating affiliated dealers' trading behavior in the corporate bond market.
Unlike equity securities-the main focus of previous literature-most bond issuers issue multiple securities over time. Therefore, when a firm issues a new bond, it is common to have an active market for its previously issued bonds.
We ask whether any underwriting-induced motives spill over to the secondary market for an issuer's existing bonds. Does the underwriter's price support role extend to existing securities? Are there other motives that are specific to existing securities? For instance, the underwriter-dealer may hedge its exposure to the credit risk of the newly issued bond by short selling other existing bonds in the secondary market. Alternatively, private information about the issuer may leak from the underwriter to the dealer, allowing the latter to trade on the resulting informational advantage.
To answer these questions, we construct a complete dataset of bond transactions and underwriting events from 2005 to 2015. We use ultimate owner information from the Federal Reserve System to hand-match an unmasked, regulatory version of TRACE trade data with a record of all firmly underwritten bond issues from SDC Platinum. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to perform a global match of underwriters in the primary bond market and securities dealers in the secondary bond market.
We find that, relative to unaffiliated dealers, affiliated dealers pay significantly higher prices for existing bonds of the same issuer, prior to, during, and after the bond offering. The price difference is economically meaningful: approximately 50 basis points at the peak. This result cannot be driven by heterogeneity across dealers (e.g., size or market power of dealers) or across bonds (e.g., contract specification or liquidity). This "aggressive bidding" action starts approximately 3 months prior to the new bonds' issue date, and lasts for roughly another 4 months afterwards, peaking 2-3 months after issue.
We argue that aggressive bidding is evidence of cross-security price support conducted by the affiliated dealers. The market yield of an issuer's existing bonds is a primary point of reference for the pricing of new bonds. Supporting existing bond prices ahead of the issue is likely to help the issuing firm in securing a lower cost of capital relative to the one that would prevail without support.
Lou, Yan, and Zhang (2013) show that the secondary market yields of preexisting U.S. Treasury bonds spike in the run-up to issuance events, representing an issuance cost of 9-18 basis points.
Similarly, Corwin (2003) shows evidence of price pressure in the run-up to seasoned equity offerings.
If this phenomenon exists in the liquid markets for Treasury bonds and equities, it is presumably even more important in the illiquid corporate bond market. Thus, the dealer's intervention to manage existing bond prices before and after the issuance event may create substantial value for the issuer. The underwriter-driven inflated price reference may induce a wealth transfer from investors in the primary market to issuers.
Buy and sell transactions by affiliated dealers can be categorized by whether the counterparty is a dealer or a client. A large price discrepancy is only observed in buy transactions when facing other dealers. A much more modest and marginally significant price discrepancy is visible for buy and sell transactions facing clients. This suggests that affiliated dealers cannot always sell bonds at a higher price, even though they purchase them at a more aggressive price, and therefore conducting a cross-security price support operation can be costly. However, we find that the size and volume of client-facing trades is much larger than that of inter-dealer trades, and therefore executing a pricing maneuver via inter-dealer trades would be more cost-efficient.
Furthermore, we show that the degree of aggressive bidding is associated with the size of the issue and the importance of the issuer as a client. The discrepancy between prices paid by affiliated and unaffiliated dealers becomes more pronounced for large issues, and when the issuer (the underwriters' client) has issued more and more frequently in the past. These heterogeneous results are consistent with underwriters' incentive to minimize their clients' cost of capital. Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) show that, in the presence of competition for underwriting mandates, the main determinant of lead-underwriter choice is the strength of past underwriting. Their finding helps us understand the underwriter-dealers' motivation to engage in pre-issuance price support.
In addition to the cross-security price support motive, alternative explanations of aggressive bidding are conceivable. These other alternative explanations differ from the price support motive in their implications for dealer variables other than transaction prices, such as inventories and profits.
For instance, underwriters' commitment to sell new bonds constitutes an implicit long position. To hedge the resulting exposure to the issuer, affiliated dealers may short-sell existing bonds relying on the expectation that prices of new and old bonds are highly correlated, and aggressive bidding (at least after the issuance event) could be evidence of short covering. However, we do not find any evidence that affiliated dealers accumulate abnormally negative inventory positions in the existing bonds prior to the underwriting event. Rather, we find evidence that all dealers (affiliated and unaffiliated) provide liquidity by accumulating positive inventories.
Alternatively, affiliated dealers may show an atypical trading pattern because they become a dominant market-maker for the security they underwrite. This phenomenon, first highlighted by Ellis et al. (2000) , is also visible in our data. If the issuance event also boosts the dealer's status as market-maker of the issuer's existing bonds, the dealer may be able to sell bonds to clients at a premium price, and as a consequence it may also be willing to make higher bids. If this is the case, the boost should translate to an increase in the dealer's market-making profits.
It is also possible that non-public information about the issuing firm may leak from underwriters to their affiliated dealers. A similar phenomenon is observed in the context of equity IPOs by Chiang, Lowry, and Qian (2018) . When the information is positive, dealers may act upon the informational advantage. The aggressive bidding pattern would reflect their attempt to build a long position before the information becomes public at the time of issue. If this is the case, the information advantage should translate to an increase in the dealer's position-taking profits.
To verify these two profit-related hypotheses, we construct measures of short-term market-making returns and long-term position-taking returns directly from dealers' trade marks. We find that both components of returns remain almost constant over the event window. This result suggest that neither the dealer's enhanced status as market-maker, nor information-driven trading are the main mechanisms that explain the aggressive bidding pattern. Also, this finding implies that the cost of pricing maneuvers through small inter-dealer trades is not large enough to observe.
In general, we find no direct evidence that affiliated dealers enjoy a boost in their status as market maker of existing bonds. Specifically, standard measures of dealer centrality do not capture any significant market structure changes that may lead to affiliated dealers becoming more central in the dealer network after underwriting events.
Our findings contribute to the literature on price dispersion in the bond market, documenting that transaction prices and execution quality are not uniform across investors and trades (Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri, 2007; Biais and Green, 2007; O'Hara, Wang, and Zhou, 2017) . 1 The same market frictions that make price discrimination possible may also provide dealers with the capability to support prices as we document in our paper.
Our results also shed light on the role of securities dealers. Most previous literature focuses on the liquidity provision role of dealers in decentralized markets (Bao, O'Hara, and Zhou, 2016; Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman, 2017; Schultz, 2017) . We show that their role is not limited to liquidity provision: they also make a significant difference for asset prices around issuance events. While it is well-documented that security underwriters conduct price support on the security being underwritten (Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter, 1997; Aggarwal, 2000) , our paper uncovers a new channel through which underwriters maneuver in the market: cross-securities price support.
More broadly, this paper contributes to a strand of literature about financial institutions' multiple roles in the market (Drucker and Puri, 2005; Chen and Martin, 2011; Chiang and Lowry, 2015) , especially with regard to potential resulting conflicts of interest (Puri, 1996; Ljungqvist et al., 2006) .
The road map of the paper is as follows. Before our empirical analysis, Section I provides institutional details for bond underwriting and data that we use. Section II discusses our main finding of an aggressive pricing pattern. Section III shows evidence that this pattern is consistent with the underwriter-dealer's incentives. Section IV discusses the time patterns of dealer inventory and profits and their implications for alternative explanations. Section V concludes.
1 Specifically, O'Hara et al. (2017) document that different insurance companies pay different price for the same bond on the same day depending on how active investors they are.
I. Data
Data Description Our main data set is the regulatory version of FINRA's TRACE database of corporate bond transactions for [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] . The data provide detailed information on all secondary corporate bond transactions. For each transaction, a dealer reports information such as bond CUSIP, trade execution date and time, trade price and quantity, a buy or sell indicator, etc.
Although the standard version of TRACE does not provide a reporting dealer's identity or a counterparty's identity, the regulatory version lets us identify the reporting dealer's name and, if the counterparty is a dealer, the counterparty's name as well.
The information on dealer identities is used to match TRACE dealers with affiliated underwriters participating in bond issues. To determine whether a dealer and underwriter are affiliated, we obtain information about lead underwriters of every firmly underwritten bond issue in SDC Platinum.
We deem dealer and underwriter to be affiliated if they are under the same holding company. Then, we mark dealers and underwriters as affiliated if in a given quarter their RSSD IDs can be mapped to the same ultimate holder.
We assign RSSD IDs to dealers and underwriters by comparing their reported names to their Federal Reserve names. For dealers in TRACE, we use an approximate string matching algorithm to find the closest match, then manually check whether the resulting matches are correct. For underwriters in SDC, we use the same procedure, except that we avoid the manual check if the underwriter address in SDC corresponds to the address reported by the Federal Reserve.
In addition to our main datasets, we use data from Mergent FISD, to obtain basic information about each bond (identified by the CUSIP number), and from CRSP, to determine whether an issuer is a private or public firm.
Sample Selection Criteria
In our empirical analysis, we investigate dealers' trading behavior in a one-year window centered around each new bond issuance event. Our main focus is on other bonds by the same issuer which already exist as of the issue date and are scheduled to mature after it. Thus, we structure our dataset so that each event is associated with all transactions of existing bonds, starting six months before the event month and ending six months after it. Moreover, we also investigate transactions of the newly issued bond starting in the event month and ending six months after it.
We impose the following sample selection criteria to construct the final sample. First, to avoid the overlap of event windows, we only consider events that are at least one year apart. (4), we only consider events 1 and 3. Second, to more sharply distinguish between trading of new bonds and trading of existing bonds, we require that bonds associated with an event be issued at least one year prior to the event date. Third, to ensure that we observe a complete time series of transactions throughout the entire event window, we exclude existing bonds that mature within 6 month after an event date. Fourth, our final sample excludes bonds from financial sector firms, identified by the 1-digit SIC code "6".
The original SDC data contains 9,620 underwriting events with 2,919 distinct issuers. The sample selection criteria result in 2,888 underwriting events with 1,760 distinct issuers, 92 underwriters and 9,551 unique associated securities (both new and existing).
In addition to these criteria regarding events and their associated securities, we also restrict the set of TRACE dealers included in our sample. The main purpose of our empirical analysis is to investigate differences in the trading behavior of affiliated dealers (the "treatment group") and unaffiliated dealers (the "control group"). In order to reduce the likelihood that our results are driven by unobservable systematic differences between underwriter-dealers and pure dealers, we would like our control group to consist of actual or potential underwriter-dealers. For example, for a bond offering underwritten by Goldman Sachs, we want to compare transactions by Goldman Sachs-affiliated dealers with those by Bank of America-affiliated dealers, but not with those by a small local dealer or a high-frequency trader. Thus, we include only trades from dealer-years (i, t) such that the parent firm of dealer i in year t is a lead underwriter of at least one event in year t − 1, t or t + 1. If there are unobserved characteristics that both cause a dealer to trade in a certain way, and make the dealer more likely to be an underwriter, then our final sample is less heterogeneous with respect to these characteristics.
Sample structure Our unit of analysis is a dealer-bond-week. Our sample is structured around event time, not calendar time. Thus, a "week" is not identified in calendar time (e.g., week 13 of year 2010) but rather relative to the event date (e.g., week -12 of event 131). For every issuance event, within the pool of eligible potential underwriter-dealers, we identify affiliated dealers as the ones whose ultimate parent company is the same the event's lead underwriter. We break our transaction-level sample into four subsamples by trade side (Buy/Sell) and counterparty type (Dealer/Client). Using the four subsamples, for each dealer-bond we calculate four weekly time series of volume-weighted average transaction prices. Thus, our transaction prices are calculated without regard to whether the counterparty is affiliated. Appendix B discusses this choice as well as alternative specifications.
Using all transactions (as opposed to the four subsamples), we also calculate weekly measures of profits at the dealer-bond level. Finally, we calculate additional dealer-level measures such as estimated inventories and measures of dealer centrality. The construction of these variables is explained when they are first introduced. Table I provides summary statistics about transactions data included in the final sample. The numbers for the leftmost columns for Total Volume and Number of Dealers are calculated from the entire TRACE database. Annual aggregate trade volume ranges from $5.8 trillion to 10.6 trillion, and the number of distinct dealers in the entire data ranges from 378 to 634. Table I shows that our final sample accounts for about 3.2-7.8% of the total volume in the entire data, with the number of distinct dealers reduced to around 50 in each year. Of these, 14-24 are affiliated with an underwriting event in each year, and trades by affiliated dealers make up about 20% of the total volume in the sample.
Summary Statistics
[Insert Table I here]
II. Transaction Prices

A. Empirical design
In our main analysis, we investigate differences in the time pattern of transaction prices of affiliated and unaffiliated dealers around bond issuance events. To do so, we use a 52-week window centered around the issue week. We divide this window into 13 four-week "months," from month -6 (6 months prior to the event) until month 6 (6 months after the event), with the event month itself being month 0.
We first estimate the following dynamic difference-in-differences specification: for dealer i trading bond j in week w from the time of a new event k (i.e. issuance of new bond k by the issuer of bond j),
Variable A ik is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if dealer i is affiliated with one of the lead underwriters of new bond k. We call this specification "dynamic" because instead of simply estimating the difference between the pre-event and post-event periods, we define 13 periods: Month kw is the event month (a number between -6 and +6) associated with event week w, and therefore The granularity of our data allows us, through the use of fixed effects, to control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity across dealers, bond, issuers, and calendar time. The specification has two sets of fixed effects. The ξ ijk term refers to fixed effects for each combination of Event × Dealer × Bond, and it enables us to focus on differences between affiliated and unaffiliated dealers in the time pattern of pricing, within each event, on a bond-by-bond basis. 2 The ξ t(k,w) term refers to fixed effects for the calendar month corresponding to week w, and it controls for common effects shared by events that happen at the same calendar time.
Our difference-in-differences approach addresses an important objection: likely, issuers do not issue at random times. Conditional on having outstanding bonds, a firm would want to issue at times when these outstanding bonds have attractive valuations. Thus, the price of bonds is likely to peak at or around the event time. However, this endogenous timing effect cannot explain a difference in the prices paid by different dealers.
Because Equation (1) is estimated using Event × Dealer × Bond fixed effects, our finding is also robust to a number of alternative explanations. For instance, a positive "buy price" coefficient may not simply reflect the fact that affiliated dealers purchase higher-priced bonds relatively more often for some reasons (e.g., the bonds have better liquidity). If that were the case, the higher price level would be absorbed by the bond component of the fixed effects.
Similarly, it is possible that affiliated dealers are, on average, different from unaffiliated dealers (e.g.
larger, or more central to the dealer network), and this somehow causes them to pay unconditionally a higher price to other dealers for all buy transactions around an issuance event. However, this explanation cannot drive our finding because the higher price level would be absorbed by the dealer component of the fixed effects.
As an important caveat, our regression shows that affiliated dealers pay higher prices for bonds around an issuance event, but no amount of fixed effects can show that affiliated dealers behave differently because of the event itself. For instance, it could be that there is some unobservable difference between affiliated dealers and unaffiliated dealers that causes affiliated dealers to act differently around bond issues. To establish causality, we would like to study a laboratory experiment in which dealers are randomly assigned to issues. Unfortunately, this is not possible; as a secondbest, however, our data selection procedure largely mitigates this concern by selecting a control group of unaffiliated dealers that starkly resembles the treatment group of affiliated dealers. In fact, we often observe near-simultaneous issue events led by different underwriters, and therefore our treatment group and control group consist of the same few firms that swap places from event to event. Figure 1 shows the main finding of our paper. Each panel reports the results of a regression estimated using one of our four subsamples by trade side and counterparty type (Buy from Dealer;
B. Monthly Dynamic Pattern
Buy from Client; Sell to Dealer; Sell to Client). Event month is on the horizontal axis (total 13 months, from -6 to +6). The vertical axis reports the γ m regression coefficient for month m from estimating Equation (1). Each coefficient measures the difference between the transaction price of affiliated dealers and unaffiliated dealers in month m, for a preexisting bond by the firm issuing a new bond in month 0. γ −6 is normalized to zero. The gray bands around the point estimate represent a 90% confidence interval.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The coefficient is expressed in percent of face value. For instance, a coefficient of 0.30 in Fig- ure 1(a) for month 0 means that affiliated dealers paid on average 30 cents per $100 face value more than unaffiliated dealers when buying bonds from other dealers. In this case, since the gray band is entirely above zero, it means that the coefficient is statistically significant-that is, in the issue month, affiliated dealers bid more aggressively for the issuer's existing bonds compared to unaffiliated dealers. The coefficient magnitude is large. For instance, it is larger than many recent estimates of average round-trip costs (Bessembinder et al., 2017; Choi and Huh, 2016; Goldstein and Hotchkiss, 2017) . This aggressive bidding behavior begins three months before the issue event-a timing roughly consistent with the reception of the underwriting mandate-and continues for a few months after the event, peaking in months 2-3. sell. In spite of the marginal statistical significance, the timing of the increase coincides in both graphs with the peak of the aggressive inter-dealer bidding activity (months 2-3).
Taken together, panels (a)-(d) suggest that affiliated dealers provide cross-security price support for the issuer's existing bonds with respect to other dealers-as they buy at high prices but do not sell at proportionally high prices-but there is no evidence that they directly provide price support for clients. This difference may appear puzzling. However, we find that the volume of client-facing buy transactions (1.5 percent of the new bond's issue size) is almost 10 times larger than its dealer-facing equivalent (0.15 percent). This volume difference suggests that it may be less costly to support prices via inter-dealer rather than client-facing purchases.
Supporting prices via inter-dealer purchases may also be more effective. The new issue increases the supply of bonds of the issuing firm, and as a consequence, all dealers' inventory exposure to that firm. Unaffiliated dealers, who have no commitment to provide price support, may readjust their inventory holdings by selling existing bonds, putting pressure on their price. Aggressive bidding sets a high floor to the value of existing bonds and works as an incentive for unaffiliated dealers not to sell off their inventory. In fact, if this incentive were perfectly successful, there should be no finding at all in panels (b) and (d), because all dealers would keep the same high bid and ask prices when facing clients.
C. Price Differences in Inter-Dealer and Client-Facing Trades
For a more formal analysis, we estimate a difference-in-differences specification similar to Equation
(1), except that in order to gain statistical power (and to reduce the number of coefficients to be reported), we divide the event window into 4 "quarters," covering months [-6, -4] , [-3, -1] , [0, 3] , and [4, 6] . Thus, each quarter spans 3 months, except that the third quarter (the one containing the event month) spans 4 months:
In this specification, we interact A ik with 1 [Quarter kw = q], an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the current week w falls within the q-th quarter. (The first quarter is the omitted category). The main coefficients of our interest are β q (q ∈ {2, 3, 4}), which capture the pricing difference between an affiliated and unaffiliated dealer prices in quarter q. The estimation results are reported in
Columns (1)- (2) and (4)- (5) of Table II , and they echo the findings of Figure 1 .
Further, we test whether the aggressive bidding patterns are statistically different between counterparty types, as specified in Equation (3). Column (3) of the table uses a sample of all buy trades (both from other dealers and from clients) and Column (6) of the table uses a sample of all sell trades (both from other dealers and from clients).
where 1 [Contra-Dealer] is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the counterparty of dealer i is another unaffiliated dealer, or 0 if the counterparty is a client, and the other variables are defined the same as in Equation (2).
Through the triple interaction term (ψ q ), we can determine whether the prices that affiliated dealers pay are statistically different between dealer trades and client trades. The result in Column (3) of Table II indicates that the purchase price paid by affiliated dealers to other unaffiliated dealers is 19 to 23 basis points larger than the price paid to clients. This difference is statistically significant in the 3 months prior to the issue event and economically large. On the other hand, Column (6) of the same table shows that there is no statistically significant difference between inter-dealer sell trades and client-facing sell trades.
[Insert Table II here]
III. Dealers' Incentives
In this section, we consider several testable implications to further verify the cross-security price support mechanism. Bidding an abnormally high price for bonds is costly, but we do not find evidence that affiliated dealers can finance this operation by selling bonds to their clients for a higher price than unaffiliated dealers. This result suggests that the aggressive bidding must be related to dealer-underwriters' incentive to cater to bond issuers.
Underwriters' incentives may involve two different channels. First, it is common for a prospective issuer to cancel the deal if the marketable bond yield does not fall under a certain desirable threshold. In this case, to avoid the loss of fees that comes with a canceled deal, the underwriter would have an incentive to try to lower the reference yield for the new bond prior to the scheduled issuance date.
Alternatively, even if the deal is guaranteed to proceed, underwriters' reputation is important for future business. Because there is a finite number of underwriters and issuers in reality, underwriterissuer matching is a repeated game. Ljungqvist et al. (2006) find that prior underwriting track record is the main determinant to winning the underwriting mandate. Although it is not possible to pin down one specific channel for the incentive, their results suggest that underwriters and their affiliates have an incentive to engage in a potentially costly price support operation with or without any particular clause in the underwriting contract. In the following subsections, we investigate two circumstances that affect the underwriter's incentives.
A. New Issue Volume and Price Difference
One important implication of the price support theory is that aggressive bidding should be more evident for larger issues. This effect should manifest itself via at least two channels. First, large issues put more pressure on the price of existing bonds, as dealers' inventories (and ultimately investors' portfolios) must accommodate a larger dollar amount of new bonds. Therefore, affiliated dealers would have to provide more liquidity. Second, underwriters have a special interest in the success of large issues because of reputation concerns as well as to maintain relationships with large clients. Large clients issue more and more frequently, and presumably generate a disproportionate fraction of underwriters' revenue. If shopping for better terms entails some form of fixed cost (e.g. a certain amount of employee time), large firms are also likely to be the most price-sensitive because they can spread the cost of shopping over a larger issuance volume. 3 Toward this end, we separate our underwriting events into two categories by issuance volume. By estimating the following specification, we investigate whether the aggressive bidding pattern is more pronounced for larger issues. are defined as in Equation (3). Table III indicate that this effect is important for small issues and small or nonexistent for large issues. Large issuers stand to gain little from endogenous timing because they issue more regularly and their bond prices are likely to be more efficient.
[Insert Table III here]
B. Underwriter-Issuer Relationships
As discussed above, underwriters' commitment to supporting the price of existing bond issues for large-volume issues may be incentivized by the value of relationship with bond issuers. Then we should observe that "good" customers get a favorable treatment. We proxy for the value of customer relationships with two variables: past number of issues (frequent issuer) and past volume of issuance (large issuer), both measured since the beginning of the sample.
For this task, we separate our bond issuers into two categories by these two criterion. By estimating the following specification, we investigate whether the aggressive bidding pattern is more pronounced when the bond issuers are likely to be valuable customers to underwriters.
where 1 [HiPastVol or HiPastNum] is an indicator variable that is 1 if the corresponding issuing firm is in the top quartile by past issue volume (HiPastVol) or past issue frequency (HiPastNum) in our sample events, and 0 otherwise. The rest variables are defined as in Equation (3). We estimate Equation (5) with an additional set of triple interaction terms. The results are reported in Tables   IV (volume of issuance) and V (number of issues).
The results appear to confirm the relationship hypothesis. Column (1) of both tables mirrors our overall result for inter-dealer buy trades. In Table IV , when we define valuable customers by past issue volume, the magnitude of the coefficient on the triple interaction term is noticeably large: for these bond issuers, we observe an interdealer buy price difference of 0.64% to 0.85%. Moreover, Column (2) of the same table suggests that affiliated dealers also buy from clients at a higher price by around 0.50% to 0.60%. These results contrast with the ones from our overall sample, in which the price support pattern is much stronger in inter-dealer trades. This difference suggests that affiliated dealers cater to frequent issuers.
Also, Column (1) of Table V shows that, for valuable customers identified by past issue frequency, affiliated dealers pay around 0.33% higher price than unaffiliated dealers for the same bond in inter-dealer trades. This pattern is significant only in inter-dealer purchases, consistent with our overall results.
In sum, we find compelling evidence that affiliated dealers aggressively bid for existing bonds of the issuer of the new bond by paying a higher price relative to unaffiliated dealers. Such behavior is most pronounced and robust in inter-dealer trades. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that cross-security price support is motivated by how important the issue is, or how important the issuer is to the underwriter.
[Insert Table V 
IV. Inventory and Profits
In the previous section, we have presented evidence consistent with a liquidity provision or premarket price support channel. In this section, we consider other plausible reasons why affiliated dealers would exhibit atypical trade patterns. For instance, dealers' use of existing bonds as a hedge would have implications for their inventory. Alternatively, any benefits dealers obtain from their position as central market makers, or from a possible informational advantage, would be reflected in their profits. To examine these possibilities, we estimate the basic specification in Equation (2) with inventory and profits as the dependent variables in order to examine whether the time pattern of these variables is consistent with these alternative explanations.
[Insert Table VI here]
A. Hedging
One possibility is that affiliated dealers use the issuer's existing bonds as a hedge. As part of a bond offering, underwriters typically commit to making a market for the new bonds. This liquidity provision role requires the underwriter and its affiliated dealer to initially hold a large positive inventory of the new bonds, then to gradually unwind the position. By taking on inventory, the dealer becomes exposed to the credit risk of the issuer. One way to mitigate this risk would be to establish a short position in the issuer's existing bonds. If the prices of new and old bonds are highly correlated, any loss on the inventory would be largely offset by gains on the short position. 4 Although this explanation is not obviously consistent with our main finding, one possibility could be that the aggressive bidding pattern is evidence of the dealer covering short positions it entered previously.
To further test this hypothesis, we estimate the same specification of Equation (2), this time with relative inventory as the dependent variable. We construct out measure of "relative inventory" as follows. First, for a given dealer and existing bond, we assume that the initial inventory is zero at the beginning of our sample, and we use transaction data to keep track of inventory at any subsequent point in time. We use this constructed inventory measure because our data contains information about transactions (flow), but not about true inventories (stock). 5 However, this measure captures the time pattern of inventory equally well, and therefore we deem it suitable for our purposes.
Next, for a given dealer and event week, we aggregate the end-of-week inventory value of all existing bonds by the event's issuer. Aggregating inventory at the issuer level is necessary because the hedging motive is well defined only at the whole-portfolio level (as opposed to the individual bond level). Of a given issuer's bonds, some may be more suitable for hedging than others for various reasons (e.g., better liquidity), and therefore, bond-level aggregation would be potentially subject to selection bias. Consequently, for this specification alone, our dependent variable is dealer-specific (y ijkw ) rather than dealer-bond-specific (y ijw ), and one observation consists of a dealer-week.
Then, we define our relative inventory measure as aggregate inventory of existing bonds as a percentage of the new issue size. Expressing inventory relative to the new issue size is robust to the great size variation that is characteristic of bond issues, and it is also consistent with the hedging motive, as clearly a large issue would require a larger short position to hedge, other things being equal.
The results are reported in Column (1) of Table VI . The estimates show no evidence that affiliated 4 For the typical equity issuer with only one class of equity securities, this mechanism is not available to the underwriters. Moreover, in the presence of multiple classes of stocks, it is usually impractical to short-sell stock of classes other than the one being issued.
5 Given the lack of information, inventory level (stock) cannot be recovered for the bonds that existed before the beginning of our sample. Nevertheless, for various reasons it is impractical to reconstruct absolute inventory even for bonds that we observe from the start. One of these reasons is that the reporting of primary market trades in TRACE is unreliable, at least in the first half of our sample. dealers establish a negative inventory on existing bonds. On the contrary, there is statistically significant evidence that all dealers increase their inventory (i.e., provide liquidity) in the period around the issue event. The difference between affiliated and unaffiliated dealers is not statistically significant. This finding directly verifies that the affiliated dealers' aggressive bidding pattern is not driven by the hedging motive.
B. Trading profits
Another possibility is that the aggressive bidding pattern is driven by a potential profit that an affiliated dealer could earn by trading the issuer's existing bonds. In this subsection, we consider two different underlying mechanisms.
First, the issuance event may boost the dealer's market-making activities. Ellis et al. (2000) find that dealers tend to become a dominant market-maker for the security offered by their affiliated underwriter. This phenomenon is also visible in our data. Figure 2 shows that the average unaffiliated dealer takes up 2.5 percent of weekly transaction volume in the 6 months after a new bond is issued. In the same period, the average affiliated dealer transacts a 3 to 6 times larger volume (7 to 18 percent). Notably, the affiliated dealer's market share peaks immediately after issuance. This result indicates that dealers' and underwriters' incentive is well aligned.
If this dominance extends to the existing bonds by the same issuer, it could explain the aggressive trading pattern we observe. For instance, by virtue of its central position in the dealer network, an affiliated dealer may be able to charge a premium ask price when selling bonds. In that case, it would also find it profitable to buy at a higher bid price.
[Insert Figure 2 here] Alternatively, it is possible that dealers acquire some private information about the firm from their affiliated underwriters and try to profit from the informational advantage. If a dealer has positive information on the firm, it may be willing to pay a premium to build a position before the information become public at the time of issuance. At least for the pre-issue period, this mechanism would explain our finding of aggressive bidding.
Both hypotheses have implications for dealers' profits. The first hypothesis implies that marketmaking profits of affiliated dealers should rise around an issuance event, whereas the second hypothesis implies that profits from information-driven position taking (position-taking profit) should increase. Accordingly, we construct a measure of total dealer profit directly from trade marks, and we decompose it into these two components based on a time threshold: positions that were built and unwound within a week are considered market making, and other positions are considered speculative (i.e., positions taken with the intent of profiting from an informational advantage). 6 To make the resulting figures comparable across dealers of different sizes, we then transform these profits into returns.
As an example, consider a dealer that makes a large initial purchase of 3,000 units of a given security in week 0. Then, over weeks 1-3, the dealer gradually liquidates 1,000 units of inventory.
In week 4, the dealer purchases 500 units of inventory and shortly after sells 700 units. Finally, in weeks 5-10 the dealer again gradually liquidates the rest of the inventory. Our interpretation of these facts is that by buying 3,000 units of the bond the dealer has taken a position, becoming exposed to the credit risk of the issuer. This position is gradually unwound over the next 10 weeks, and any resulting profits should be counted as position-taking profits. However, the downward inventory trend of weeks 1-10 is briefly interrupted by a bout of market-making in week 4: the dealer has made a quick round-trip transaction: it bought 500 and quickly sold 700 units of the bond with little or no exposure to credit risk. The profits from this activity should be counted as market-making profits. Our procedure to calculate profits and returns reflects this interpretation, and it is described in detail in Appendix A.
To test our hypotheses, we use our newly constructed variables as independent variables in Equation (2). Columns (2)- (3) of Table VI report the estimates for market-making returns and positiontaking returns, respectively. The profit level remains almost constant over the event time window as well as the difference between affiliated and unrelated dealer is close to zero and not significant, with respect to both short-term market-making and long-term position taking activities.
Thus, at least for preexisting securities of the same issuer, affiliated issuers do not seem to be at an advantage. The lack of abnormal market-making profits indicates that dealers do not enjoy a superior market power due to their status of central market maker, as opposed to the case with new bonds they underwrite. Also, the lack of abnormal position-taking profits implies that informationdriven trading is not possible or at least it is not the main mechanism for the aggressive bidding.
[Insert Table VII here] Further, Li and Schürhoff (2014) show that in the municipal bond market more central dealers enjoy higher spreads. If issuance events are to have a positive effect on the dealer's profits, they should do so by increasing the dealer's centrality. Table VII shows the results of estimating Equation (2) using standard centrality measures from Li and Schürhoff (2014) as the dependent variable.
The table shows no clear pattern, suggesting that the dealer's status as market-maker of existing securities does not effectively receive a significant boost from the issuance event.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate a situation with the potential for a conflict of interest. The typical underwriter also has a separated business as securities dealer and market-maker. In the primary market, the underwriter's goal is to aid bond issuers in lowering their cost of borrowing by selling the new bond at a price as high as possible. In the secondary market, the security dealer's goal is to transact securities in the most efficient manner for its clients.
In this paper, we show that dealers act in the secondary market to support the prices of the prospective issuer's preexisting bonds. We argue that these maneuvers aim at producing a reference price, visible to all secondary market participants, that is favorable to the prospective issuer. The abnormally high transaction price paid by affiliated dealers is statistically robust and its magnitude is economically meaningful. Such a pattern is not explained by other plausible reasons that may cause affiliated dealers to behave differently relative to unrelated dealers.
Our findings suggest that the scope of current regulations aimed at preventing conflict of interest, such as Title V of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, may have to be much more general in order to fulfill the policy objective. 
Figure 1. Dynamic Price Regression
Plot of the estimated γm coefficients from Equation (1). The coefficients measure the difference between the transaction prices of affiliated and unaffiliated dealers for a given preexisting bond by the firm issuing a new bond in month 0. The marker is the coefficient point estimate, and the shaded area around it shows the 90% confidence interval. We break our total sample of trades into four subsamples by trade side (Buy/Sell) and counterparty type (Dealer/Client).
Each of the four panels shows the estimates from a regression using one of our subsamples. Each regression run for each panel includes Dealer × Event × Cusip fixed effects and Calendar Month fixed effects. The unit of observation for each regression is a dealer-bond-week. Standard errors are clustered at the Event level. This table shows coefficient estimates that measure the difference between the transaction prices of affiliated and unaffiliated dealers for a given bond previously issued by the firm issuing a new bond in month 0. Equation (1), (2), (4) , and (5) show estimates from a regression with a subsample conditional on trade types that differ with respect to two aspects: whether a dealer buys or sells a bond (Buy or Sell) and whether the dealer's counterparty is another dealer or a client (Dealer or Client). Equation (3) and (6) show estimates from a regression with a subsample just conditional on whether a dealer buys or sells a bond (Buy or Sell). The unit of observation for each regression is a Dealer × Cusip × Week. Each specification includes Dealer × Cusip × Event fixed effects and Month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the Dealer × Cusip × Event level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The number of stars (*) represents statistical significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). (3) show estimates for the hypotheses that affiliated dealers acquire private information about the bond issuer and make greater profits from the information through market making (2) and position taking (3) . The unit of observation is a Dealer × Week × Event for Column (1), and a Dealer × Week × Cusip for Columns (2) and (3). The unit of the dependent variable in column (1) is 100%. That is, a unit increase of the dependent variable is a 100% increase. The unit of the dependent variables in columns (2) and (3) is one basis point. That is, a unit increase of the dependent variables is a one basis point increase. The specification for column (1) includes Dealer × Event fixed effects and Month fixed effects. The specifications for columns (2) and (3) 
Appendix A. Measuring dealer profits and returns
A dealer may engage in both market making activity as well as take positions as principal. Our goal is to decompose total dealer profits into market-making profits and position-taking profits, i.e., speculative positions taken with the intent to profit from changes in the value of a security. LIFO accounting matches each position liquidation with the most recent trades that built that position, thereby enabling us to identify the quick reversals that are characteristic of market-making activity (Fig. 3) .
Under LIFO accounting, every transaction that moves inventory towards zero unwinds a position and thereby realizes a gain. Loss is just negative gain, and a short position is just negative inventory.
Zero inventory is simply defined as the initial state of the dealer's inventory at the beginning of sample. Every time a position is unwound, a walkback procedure identifies matched transactions,
i.e., the past transactions that were used to establish the position. 
i.e., the time between the current unwind date and the oldest transaction date.
Then, we calculate market-making (MM) and position-taking (PT) profits: 
Next, we use these profits to calculate returns.
MM Return = MM Profit/ |Basis| PT Return = PT Profit/Average Absolute Inventory.
Average Absolute Inventory is calculated as the time-weighted average of the absolute value of inventory within a week:
where t i is the time of trade i = 1, 2, . . . N executed in a week, t 0 = 0 is the beginning of the week, and t N +1 = 1 is the end of the week (the time of one week is normalized to 1 so that the time inventory is held can be directly used as a weight). This definition of returns requires some caveats.
First, in calculating returns, the denominator is the absolute value of Basis (for market-making)
or Inventory (for position-taking). For normal firms, return is calculated as profit divided invested capital. For a dealer, inventory is not a measure of invested capital. Instead, the dealer is likely to have to commit capital in the form of margin for both long and short positions (margin on repuchase agreements and similar arrangements, for long positions, and outright margin for short positions). Thus, we assume that committed capital is proportional to the dollar risk taken, i.e., to the absolute dollar size of the inventory, regardless of sign.
Second, position-taking return is calculated on a standard time period (one week) and then annualized. However, market-making return is not annualized, but rather measured on a per-transaction basis. If a dealer quickly buys and sells a security within one second, and then lays idle for the next 59 seconds, it is hard to argue that the dealer's capital was committed only for that one second.
However, annualizing returns measured on a per-transaction basis amounts to making this implicit assumption and leads to results that defy intuition. 7
Arguably, even per-transaction accounting presents an incomplete view, as our measure of "returns" 
However, this procedure would require an arbitrary determination of the amount of committed capital (in this example, the highest absolute level of inventory). To avoid this arbitrary determination, we use our simpler measure.
For robustness, we also calculate market-making return using a 30-day instead of 7-day threshold to identify market-making activity. These results are unreported because they are essentially identical. Thus, in Specification 1, we contrast transaction prices (buy or sell) between affiliated and unaffiliated dealers without distinguishing counterparty type (either another affiliated or unaffiliated dealer).
Our current analyses do not depend on any assumptions that affiliated dealers may have additional motivation to exhibit different trade behaviors depending on the type of dealer counterparties (either affiliated or unrelated). Therefore, we believe that this specification is the most consistent with our empirical design.
However, Specification 1 is only one of several comparisons that could have been carried out. The rest of this appendix describes alternative possible specifications.
Alternative asymmetric specification
Specification 1 is asymmetric, i.e., it require a different specification for buy and sell trades. At least one other asymmetric specification is possible. 
Specification 2s
